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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ELVA ROMRELL, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
No. 18211 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
N .A., and ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL 
BANK OF OGDEN, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Elva Romrell sought specific performance of an oral contract 
to sell 160 acres of real property located in Weber County, Utah, general damages 
for breach of contract and damages for fraud. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff dismissed her claim for damages for breach of contract at 
the time of trial. The trial court denied plaintiffs motion for directed verdict. 
The jury returned a general verdict directing specific performance. The trial 
court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants, directing 
specific performance, and thereafter denied defendants' motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative for a new trial. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants and appellants seek to have the judgment of the lower 
court reversed, and judgment entered in favor of defendants and against 
plaintiff: or in the alternative • a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early part of 1975 Zions First National Bank of Ogden began 
foreclosure proceedings against real and personal property of Muirbrook Farms 
Inc. Zions First National Bank had participated in the loan, and was, therefore. 
involved in decisions on the foreclosure process (R. 497-498). 
On March 19, 1975, Zions First National Bank of Ogden entered 
into a written agreement with Dairy Capital Corporation, which provided, am0n< 
other things, that if Zions First National Bank of Ogden was the high bidder on 
the real and personal property to be sold at foreclosure sale, 160 acres of the 
real property would be sold to Dairy Capital Corporation for a total sum of 
$190,000.00 (Ex. P2). 
During April, 1975, plaintiff, a sister of Lawrence Muir brook. 
one of the p!'incipal officers of Muirbrook Farms, Inc. , learned of the forth-
coming sale, and decided to investigate the status of the real property (R · 23; · 
239). She approached an officer of Zions First National Bank, indicating an 
interest in acquiring the property (R. 240-249). She was immediately informec 
of and given a copy of the Dairy Cflpit'll Corporation Agreement (R. 251 252 · 
330 .333). During the months of April. :\lay. June and July. 1975. there were 
negoti:1tions and discussions between plmnt1ff and defendnnts :md pLllntirf 
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Floyd Brown, president of Dairy Capital Corporation, relating to a poeaible 
purchase of the real and personal property (R.253-272 ,329-358,501-513). 
Plaintiff discussed the possibility of purchasing either the 160 acres or the total 
450 acres that would be sold (R. 343,344, 359) . The parties conducted their nego-
tiations on the theory that plaintiff would acquire the real property by acquiring 
in some way the rights of Dairy Capital Corporation under the March 19, 1975, 
Agreement (R. 341,342,346, 355) , and thereafter leasing the property to Dairy 
Capital Corporation (R. 255 , 262) . This was plaintifr s understanding right up 
to the morning of the sale (R. 363) . Though plaintiff and Dairy Capital Corpora-
tion represented to defendants on several occasions that they had reached an 
agreement whereby plaintiff would acquire the rights of Dairy Capital (R. 349, 
35 2 , 35 3, 354, 35 8 , 42 7 , 506, 507) , the fact is that no such agreement was ever 
signed (R. 354) . 
On the morning of July 25, 1975, the date of the scheduled sale, 
plaintiff met with Floyd Brown in Ogden, Utah (R. 358). She was presented 
with a written lease document, which she would not sign (R. 359). Floyd Brown 
told her on that occasion that if she would not sign he would bid against her, 
and that she could not buy the property without his permission (R. 360) . Her 
meeting with Floyd Brown broke up approximately 15 minutes before the 
scheduled sale (R. 27 4, 275) . She immediately went to the Courthouse. where 
the sale was to take place, and reported to Angus Belliston, an officer of Zions 
First ~ationa1 Bank, that there was no contract between her and Floyd Brown 
CR. 361 .515). Plaintiff testified that during that conversation Mr. Belliston said, 
.. You don't have a thing to worry about. If you get the personal property, we 
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willsellyoutherealproperty. Youdon'tneedMr. Brown" (R.275). Mr. 
&elliston denies making that statement and testified that he had no authority 
to make such an arrangement (R.515,516,518). Based on that conversation, 
plaintiff decided to bid for the personal property . 
The personal property was offered for sale first. Plaintiff, after 
competitive bidding against Floyd Brown, purchased it for $65,000.00 (R. 277). 
She later received a written Bill of Sale for that personal property (R.314, Ex. 
PlO) . The real property was then offered for sale. Zions First National Bank 
of Ogden made one bid for the entire acreage, and was the high bidder, as no 
other bids were received (R. 278). 
On July 25, 1975, Dairy Capital Corporation was in possession of 
both the real and personal property (R. 364) . That company, or one of the 
entities controlled by it, remained in possession until Dairy Capital Corpora-
tion was adjudged a bankrupt on January 20, 1977 (R. 364,365, 366). Plaintiff 
later bought some cows from the Trustee in Bankruptcy (R. 321) and thereafter 
had her brother, Lawrence Muir brook, and nephew, Robert Muir brook. work 
for her on the property (R. 367,386,421,422, 436) . She did not inform defendan:; 
that she was taking possession of the real property (R. 367) . The Bankruptcy 
Court has not yet disclaimed the real property (R. 531). 
Subsequent to the sale. plaintiff contacted Angus Belliston and 
attempted to make arrangements for the sale to her of the 160 acres, under the 
terms set forth in the Dairy Capital Corporation contract. Defendants refuse,~ 
to sell the real property to her. The present lawsuit was filed in Octr,l>c 
1975 (R.l). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE 
SINCE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF AN ENFORCE-
ABLE CONTRACT AND FAILED TO ESTABLISH ACTS OF PART PERFORM-
ANCE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT OUT OF THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 2 5-5-3 , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
Every contract . . . for the sale of any land or any interest 
in land shall be void unless the contract or some note or 
memo thereof is in writing subscribed by the parties by 
whom the sale is to be made . 
Section 25-5-8 then provides: 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to 
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific per-
formance of agreement in case of part performance thereof. 
Several cases decided by this court have laid down the preliminary 
criteria for enforcing oral contracts for the sale of land. In re Madsen's Estate, 
12 3 Utah 327, 259 P. 2d 595 (1953); In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P. 2d 
278 (1954); Christensen vs. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P. 2d 101 (1959). 
In Christensen vs. Christensen, supra, the court expressed the 
principle that a plaintiff seeking specific performance of an oral contract must 
establish the terms thereof with a greater degree of certainty than is required 
in an action at law, and must show a clear mutual understanding and a positive 
agreement of both parties to the terms of the contract; and therefore, in order 
to involve the offices of equity in its enforcement, the facts of the case must be 
inconsistent with any other conclusion than that the parties had a definite under-
standmg with respect to the oral agreement. This concept was reiterated in 
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Woolsey va. Brown, 539 P. 2d 1035 (Utah 1975). The doctrine was clarified ant 
extended in Holmgren Brothers, Inc. vs. Ballard, 534 P. 2d 611 (utah 1975), 
in which the court ruled that before an oral contract for the sale of an interest 
in land can be enforced, the oral contract must be clear, definite, mutually 
understood, and established by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony or 
other evidence of the same quality. In addition, there must be acts of part per· 
formance which in equity are considered sufficient to take the case out of the 
statute of frauds, such as (1) improvements which are substantial, valuable or 
beneficial; (2) payment of a valuable consideration; (3) if there is a possession 
such possession must be actual, open, definite , not concurrent with the vendor 
but must be with the consent of the vendor; and (4) such acts as are relied on 
must be exclusively referrable to the contract. 
Plaintiff introduced no evidence that would in any way suggest that 
there was a written contract between plaintiff and defendants. Nor was there 
evidence that there was a written memorandum of any oral agreement. Plaintiff· 
case, therefore, must stand or fall on whether there was an oral contract, and 
whether such oral contract was partially performed by her. 
The evidence showed that the basis on which plaintiff carried on 
negotiations with defendants was that she would acquire in some way the right' 
of Dairy Capital Corporation. On the morning of July 25, 1975, all arrangerr.e'' 
with Dairy Capital Corporation failed. Plaintiff then knew and so informed 
i\lr. Belliston that she could not acquire the rights of Dairy Capital, and th31 
therefore. she had no arrangement with either of the defendants There:1ft, · 
came the tleeting conversation between plaintiff :md \lr. Belliston momcr.t· 
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before the sale was to take place, during which plaintiff claims the oral contract 
was made. Mr. Belliston denies that there was any such agreement. Plaintift 
admitted that at no time during the brief conversation were details of a contract 
discussed, such as the identity of the contracting parties, the quantity or des-
cription of the land to be purchased, the price, the terms of payment, date& of 
payment, inclusion of water shares, problems with liens then existing against 
the property, or other essential terms which a contract for sale of real property 
should contain (R. 329,330, 363) . Also, there is a complete lack of evidence in 
the record which would show that the terms of the contract were mutually 
understood by the parties. 
The evidence is undisputed that on July 25, 1975, the date of the 
alleged oral contract to sell the property, Dairy Capital Corporation was in 
possession of the real property, that it remained in possession from that date 
until it was adjudged a bankrupt; that since that time until the present time, 
the property has been in the constructive possession of the Trustee in Bankruptcy 
for Dairy Capital Corporation. Plaintiff attempted to establish the fact that she had 
taken possession by testifying that her brother, Lawrence Muirbrook, and her 
nephew, Robert Muirbrook both took possession of the property on her behalf. 
However, both she and they were forced to admit that they were not there on her 
behalf, but as employees of Dairy Capital Corporation, or a related entity (R. 319, 
322.365,367,385,386,399,421,422,426, 436). After Dairy Capital was adjudged a 
bankrupt, Lawrence ;\luirbrook and Robert Muirbrook did work for plaintiff on 
the property, but she obtained no consent from defendants for the use and 
<lCC"Upancy of the land. Also, as will be discussed under another point, upon 
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the tlling of the petition in bankruptcy, all persons, including plaintiff, were 
precluded from taking any action with reference to the property , without per-
mission of the Bankruptcy Court. That permission has not yet been granted. 
There was evidence that plaintiff had leveled some land and repail'!( 
eome corrals (R. 367) . However, there is no evidence that such work is valuable 
or beneftcial, or that it was done pursuant to a contract, or with the knowledge 
and consent of defendants , the alleged vendors . In fact , the evidence shows tht 
plaintiff attempted to keep from defendants the fact that she was attempting to tal:e 
possession. 
A third method by which a part may establish part performance is 
through payment of all or part of the purchase price. Plaintiff admits that she 
did bid for and purchase the personal property at the foreclosure sale for the 
sum of $65,000.00. A Bill of Sale conveying the personal property was executed 
by defendant Zions First National Bank of Ogden, and given to plaintiff as proof 
of her purchase (Ex. PlO). No mention or reference to the real property or lang-. 
age of sales price for the real property, down payment, or other indication that 
the personal property was related to the real property is found in that document 
The payment of $65,000. 00 was made strictly for the personal property. and wa: 
not part payment on the real property. Plaintiff testified that she intended the 
$65.000.00 as part payment on the real property. and that she should have reci: 
that amount of credit on the total purchase price of $190,000.00. However· Jn .;: 
to remove an oral contract from the statute of frauds on the ground of part per: : 
ance. payment must not only be deli\·ered to. but must be accepted by the v.:nc · 
in discharge of part or all oi the purchase price. Holmgren Bruthcr~. !IlL 
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Ballard, supra. There was no evidence that defendants accepted the $85,000.08 
as part of the sales price of the real property. 
At the conclusion of her evidence, therefore, plaintiff had not 
established (1) that she had made any valuable or beneficial improvements on the 
land; (2) that she had paid any sum as part of the purchase price or that any sum 
had been accepted by defendant as part of the purchase price; (3) that abe had 
taken open, definite possession with the consent of defendants; or (4) that any 
such acts were exclusively referrable to the alleged oral contract. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY AS TO THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL 
Instruction No. 7 given to the jury read: 
You are instructed that although the law generally 
requires an agreement to sell real property to be in writing 
this is not so in all cases . Among the exceptions to the 
general rule are situations where there has been part per-
formance or where under all the facts and circumstances 
the seller has acted in such a manner as to be estopped to 
assert or claim that there was no written agreement. These 
exceptions are fully explained in the next two instructions. 
Instruction 9 read: 
You are instructed that when, by conduct or by 
verbal statements, a party encourages another to purchase 
property or to engage in a transaction or otherwise favor 
someone else upon the understanding or belief that such 
party will do or perform a certain act, then and in that 
event the party encouraging or instigating consumation of 
such transaction is precluded or estopped from refusing to 
complete the transaction upon which the other party relied 
:1s a condition for his action. 
These instructions were given over the objection of defendants. The 
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theory of estoppel had not been raised in either the pleadings or the Pretrial ~ 
The theory of a case which a plaintiff is entitled to have presented to the jury ct 
be no broader than his pleadings. McDonald vs. Union Pacific Railway Com2! 
109 Utah 493, 167 P. 2d 685 (1946). Where an issue has not been framed in eithe: 
the pleadings or the Pretrial Order, it is improper to allow the issue to be raiset 
over the objection of opposing counsel. Youngren vs. John W. Lloyd Constl'\A' 
tion Company, 22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P. 2d 985 (1969); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemk 
Sales, Inc. vs. Lords, 23 Utah 2d 152, 460 P. 2d 321 (1969). This court has a1; 
held that a party who has an opportunity to do so must specifically plead estoppt 
and when it is not pleaded, it is inadmissible. Collett vs. Goodrich, 199 Utah 
662, 231 P. 2d 730 (1951). See also Tracy Loan & Trust Co. vs. Openshaw Im 
Co., 162 Utah 508, 132 P. 2d 388 (1942). 
In addition to the fact that the issue of estoppel was not raised in 
the pleadings or the Pretrial Order, estoppel is not a proper legal doctrine to 
be considered under the facts of the instant case. The general rule is that 
estoppel may not be used against the statute of frauds in such a manner as to 
frustrate the basic policy of the statute. Easton vs. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 
295 P.2d 332 (1956). See 56 A.L.R. 1037 at 1052, §4(a), and cases cited. 
A situation similar to the instant case existed in Ravarino vs. Pric; 
123 Utah 559, 260 P. 2d 570 (1953). There the plaintiff sought to compel convey: 
of two tracts of real estate owned by the defendant, claiming that he had purch:' 
an adjacent lot in reliance upon defendant's oral promise to make the conveyar.c• 
The court found that while estoppel may be recognized when a misrepresent 3:: · 
as to the future oper:ltes as an abandonment of the existing right on the part 
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part making the misrepresentations, the facts of the caae would not permit eetoppe1 
to apply since defendant's alleged promise to execute the conveyance of the pro-
perty did not operate as an abandonment of an existing right. Tbe court furtber 
noted that it was the plaintiff who had initiated the discussions between the putiea, 
and who sought to have the defendant part with his interest in the land, ao that it 
could not be said that defendant's representation that he would execute a convey-
ance was in any way done to induce plaintiff to change his conduct or alter his 
position. In the instant case plaintiff alleges that she purchased the personal pro-
perty in reliance on oral promises by defendants to make conveyances of the real 
property . As in Ravarino, plaintiff initiated the discussion between the parties 
and attempted to have the defendants part with their interest in the land. 
Shortly after the decision in Ravarino, this court reaftlrmed the 
limited application of estoppel in cases involving the statute of frauds in Easton 
vs. Wycoff, supra. There, defendant Wycoff had orally agreed to lease property 
to plaintiff, drew up a lease agreement, and permitted plaintiff to move items on 
to the property. However, reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant's promise 
to execute a written lease did not estop the defendant from setting up the statute 
of frauds as a defense to an action on the contract where the plaintiff did not 
expend any moneys on the leased premises, but was damaged because of loss of 
a good bargain. In a similar vein, plaintiff Romrell's purchase of the personal 
property was not an expenditure of money on the real property, but, as shown 
by the Bill of Sale, was paid for the personal property. Her damages, if any, 
relate to the loss of a good bargain. Therefore, defendants are not estopped from 
J'aismg the statute of frauds as a defense, in spite of any alleged or proved reliance. 
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More recently this court has again reaffirmed the use of the doctrinf 
of estoppel in McKinnon vs. The Corporation of the President of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 529 P. 2d 434 (Utah 1974). There, plaintr 
initiated an action to recover damages which he allegedly sustained by way of 
defendant's breach of an oral contract to convey a haulage way for coal over 181\c 
in which it had an interest. In addition to other allegations, plaintiff urged that 
defendant was estopped to assert the statute of frauds. In responding to plaintif 
theory, the court recalled its earlier decision in Easton vs. Wycoff, supra, that 
estoppel could be extended in limited form to cases concerned with the statute of 
frauds, where the promise as to future conduct constituted an intended abandon-
ment of an existing right of the promisor. The court continued: 
However, a mere promise to execute a written contract and 
subsequent refusal to do so, is insufficient to create estoppel, 
although reliance is placed on such promise and damage is 
sustained as a consequence of the refusal. The acts and con-
duct of the promisor must so clearly manifest an intent that 
he will not assert the statute that to permit him to do so would 
be to work a fraud upon the other party. At Page 437 (Emphasis 
added). 
The court noted that while plaintiff had marshaled a "plethora" of factual issues 
none involved conduct on the part of defendant that would be tantamount to a 
representation that it would not avail itself of the statute of frauds. In the ins!.: 
case no evidence was presented showing conduct on the part of defendants ind:-
cati:1g that they would not avail themselves of the defense of statute of frauds 
The theory of estoppel. therefore. is not applicable in the case. 
As the issue of estoppel was not r"ised in the ple:1dings •W in the 
Pretrial Order. and not consented tc '0y deiendants "t tri:ll. defcnd:m~=' ,.,, :· 
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unduly and unfairly prejudiced by the instruction. Where the inatructiorul are 
extraneous to the issues and evidence, it is error to give them. Moore va. 
Denver • Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P .2d 849 (1958). 
The error in submitting that issue to the jury was so substantial and prejudicial 
that defendants were deprived of a fair trial; and there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the result would have been different in absence of such error. Batt vs. State, 
28 Utah 417, 503 P.2d 855 (1972); Calahan vs. Wood, 24 Utah 2d 8, 465 P.2d 169 
(1970); Hall vs. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P. 2d 664 (1966). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FORECLOSURE OF REAL PRO-
PERTY AND FORECLOSURE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Throughout the trial , plaintiff and her counsel raised questions as 
to whether defendant Zions First National Bank of Ogden had liquidated the real 
and personal property in a legally proper manner and in the proper sequence 
(R.243, 265,316,317 ,371,372,403). Defendants requested the court to give the 
following instruction: 
When a loan which is secured by personal property 
is in default, the creditor must foreclose on that property 
in accordance with a section of law known as the Utah Uni-
form Commercial Code. This law sets forth the procedures 
which must be followed in any such foreclosure of personal 
property. If, however, a loan which is secured by real 
property under a Trust Deed is in default, foreclosure must 
be pursued under the Utah law relating to Trust Deed fore-
closures, which calls for procedures which are different 
and distinct from the foreclosure requirements under the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
The personal property foreclosure proceedings are set forth in 
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Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commerical Code, 170A-9-501 et seq. These 
provtaiona are very much different than the trust deed foreclosure procedures 
Mt forth in 157-1-19 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Defendants were 
entitled to have the jury be aware of those differences. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON THE EFFECT OF FILING A PETITION IN BANKRUPTCY 
As discussed in Point I , one of the most important factual issues in 
the case is the matter of possession of the real property. One of the elements tJu 
plaintiff must prove , in order to take the alleged oral contract out of the statute c 
frauds is that she took possession of the real property pursuant to the contract. 
She claimed that she did take possession, while defendants claimed that she die 
not. The undisputed facts show that Dairy Capital Corporation was in possessic: 
of the real property on July 25, 1975, the date of the alleged oral contract, and 
that it stayed in possession until it was adjudged a bankrupt on January 21. W 
(R. 321). Plaintiff, after the bankruptcy of Dairy Capital, sought to take poses> 
of the property, and did so without the knowledge of defendants, and without t:· 
permission of the Trustee in Bankruptcy. Since this was an issue that was con· 
sidered by the jury, the defendants are entitled to have the jury instructed or, 
the effect of bankruptcy. Defendants requested the following instruction: 
The law provides that at the moment a person or 
corporation files n petition in bankruptcy all property. 
both real and personal. in which the bankrupt claims any 
right. title or interest. •:ests in :1 Trustee in Bankruptcv 
and is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy 
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Court . In addition , all creditors are automatically 
prevented from taking any action whatsoever againat 
the property on which they claim a lien or ownerllhip 
which is under such exclusive jurisdiction. This 
restraint remains in full force and effect and will not 
terminate until and unless the Bankruptcy Court grants 
permission to such creditors to take action to recover 
the property. 
The trial court refused to give the instruction. Without such an instruction the 
jury could well wonder why the defendants did not take possession themselves, 
after the bankruptcy of Dairy Capital. It was error to refuse such instruction. 
It is consistent with §70 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S .C. 1110) and Bankruptcy 
Rule 601. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION 
OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE TO THE JURY FOR A GENERAL 
VERDICT AND REFUSING TO SUBMIT SPECIAL 
INTERROGATORIES TO THE JURY 
An action for specific performance of an agreement to convey real 
property is an equitable action, and thus the final decisions on that type of case 
must always be reserved for the court. Section 78-21-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, provides: 
In actions for the recovery of specific real . . . property, 
with or without damages . . . an issue of fact may be tried 
by a jury .. 
Section 78-21-2 provides: 
All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other 
than those mentioned in the next section (78-21-3), are 
to be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon is to 
be addressed to them. except when otherwise provided. 
When a general verdict will best settle the issues, it should be used, 
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but where specific issues cannot be reached by a general verdict , the trial co~~r~' 
lhould take advantage of the special verdict or special interrogatories . Baker ' 
-
va. Cook, 8 Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d 264 (1957). 
Defendants, by requesting special interrogatories to the jury 
(R .112) , asked that the jury answer the following questions: 
1. Did defendants, on or about July 25, 1975, enter into an oral 
contract with plaintiff whereby they agreed to sell to her the 160 acres of land 
which is the subject of this case? 
2. Were the terms of this contract clear and definite? 
3. Were the terms of the contract mutually understood by both 
plaintiff and defendants? 
4. Did plaintiff ever take possession of the land? 
5. If so, did she take possession with the knowledge and consent 
of defendants? 
6. Was such possession open, actual and definite, and exclusive' 
7. Did plaintiff make any substantial, valuable or beneficial 
improvements upon the land which was the subject of the oral agreement? 
8. If so, was the value of plaintifr s improvements to the land suer. 
that defendants could not compensate her by way of monetary payment? 
9. Did plaintiff make payment to defendants either in whole or ir. 
part for the land~ 
10. Did defendants accept any payment tendered by plaintiff as 
payment for the land'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-17-
The answers to these questions would have given the court tbe 
basis for making decisions whether there was an oral contract tor the con.-,-
of the land, and whether there had been any action which would take tbe ow.-
action out of the statute of frauds . Defendants were entitled to 1mow the flDdiDp 
of the jury on these issues of fact. Instead of seeking the answere to laeuee of 
fact, the court submitted the entire case to the jury on a general verdict (K .115) . 
This was error. It was contrary to the concept that the jury is the trier of the 
fact and that the court makes the final legal decisions based on the ftndinp of 
fact by the jury. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT BE-
CAUSE THERE IS NO REASONABLE BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE NOR 
ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
Relief from a judgment should be granted when it appears that the 
processes of justice have been so completely thwarted or distorted as to persuade 
the court that in fairness and good conscience the judgment should stand. Haner 
vs. Haner, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P. 2d 577 (1962). In Koer vs. Mayfair Markets, 
19 Utah 2d 566, 431 P. 2d 339 (1967), the court decided that the standard upon 
which a judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted is whether there 
is an absence of substantial evidence supporting the verdict. 
In the present case , there has been no evidence, let alone substantial 
evidence, going to the essential clarity and definiteness of a contract on July 25, 
1975, or as to plaintifrs part performance which would be legally sufficient to 
compel specific performance of an oral contract for the sale of land. This is true 
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even when viewing the evidence most favorable to plaintiff, as required by 
Winters vs. W .S. Hatch Co., 546 P. 2d 603 (Utah 1976). As there was no evic~tt 
on these critical elements, it is apparent the jury has been forced to speculate. 
This court cannot permit such speculation. This problem is emphasized when 11 
consider that we do not know the factual basis for the decision of the jury. 
POINT VII 
IF THE COURT DOES NOT AWARD DEFENDANTS A JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, DEFENDANTS ARE 
ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL 
Defendants claim that the evidence was insufficient to ever get the 
question of specific performance to a jury, that the evidence is insufficient to 
justify the verdict, and that the trial court erred in giving some instructions to 
the jury and failing to give others and in submitting the question of specific per· 
formance to the jury under a general verdict. A trial judge has not only a right 
but a "responsibility to see that justice is done by setting aside a verdict if it 
plainly appears that there has been a miscarriage of justice." Lund vs. Phillit 
Petroleum Co .. 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960). A trial court has a duty to 
grant a new trial when the proceedings have been offensive to its sense of justlc, 
Hyland vs. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P .2d 736 (1967). If a 
verdict is the result of passion or prejudice, it is both the prerogative and dutl 
of the court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. Efco Distributin!L 
Inc. vs. Perrin. 17 Utah 2d 375,412 P.2d 615 (1966). 
As the original contract between defendants and Dairy Capitnl 
Corporation became invalid when one of its terms failed. as plaintJff ne\.,,,. , .. 
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assumed the terms of that contract, and since there was no substantial evidence 
of a clear and definite oral contract entered into on July 25, 11175, or part per-
formance of such a contract, the jury must have reached its verdict on the bui8 
of speculation or emotion. Under all of the circumstances, therefore, the leaat 
defendants are entitled to is a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence introduced by plaintiff as to the existence and terms 
of an oral contract for the sale of land between plaintiff and defendants relates 
solely to the contract entered into between defendants and Dairy Capital Corpora-
tion under date of March 19, 1975. The undisputed evidence is that the terms of 
that contract failed, and that plaintiff did not assume the position of Dairy Capital 
under that contract as she had planned. There is highly disputed evidence of an 
oral contract made during a fleeting conversation on July 25, 1975, although 
there is no dispute that such a contract, if made, was not certain as to any terms 
and was not mutually understood by both parties. There is no evidence that 
plaintiff took possession of the real property pursuant to the alleged contract or 
with the knowledge of defendants, or took any other action that can be considered 
part peformance of the alleged oral contract. It is urged, therefore, that this 
court should reverse the judgment of the trial court, and enter judgment for 
defendants. In the alternative, the court should grant defendants a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John H. Allen 
CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
.... 
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